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The negotiations on the third bailout package for Greece are still going on, but the 
euro area has already paid a high price for it. The compromise on which it is based 
is clearly very controversial. Some of its critics believe that it does not make sense 
in economic terms, whereas others point out that it may have an adverse political 
effect. But what in fact is Greece actually supposed to be doing, and what does all 
this mean with regard to sovereignty and democracy?
The heads of state and government of the euro 
area struggled for 17 hours to reach an agreement 
designed to reconcile Greece’s financial needs 
with the security requirements of the creditor 
nations. What has emerged is a key issues paper 
which makes demands on the Greek govern-
ment that even Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel 
called “harsh” in her first public statement on 
the subject. In this Spotlight Europe we explain 
the small print of the agreement and the obsta-
cles that may yet have to be overcome before the 
negotiations are completed. We then turn to the 
question of whether or not the agreement is con-
sonant with the democratic aspirations of the EU.
From the Key Issues Paper to the 
Third Bailout Package. The Next Steps
 
Step One – From the Conclusion of the Summit to 
the Start of the Negotiations: The Euro Summit 
came to an end early in the morning on Monday, 
13 July 2015. The Greek government had until the 
following Wednesday (15 July 2015) to get par-
liament to vote on a first package of measures 
and to obtain its basic assent to the whole of the 
Key Issues Paper. The four immediate measures 
were concerned with VAT and pension reform, 
the statistics authority and the debt brake. On 
Thursday and Friday the parliaments in Berlin, 
2
sp
ot
lig
ht
 e
ur
op
e 
# 
20
15
 / 
03
  M
on
ey
 o
r 
D
em
oc
ra
cy
? 
•	 Development of an improved privatization 
programme. Transfer of valuable Greek assets 
to an independent fund which will monetize 
the assets
•	 Modernization and greater effectiveness of the 
Greek bureaucracy (depoliticization).
But how are these measures going to work out 
in practice, and what are the various timelines? 
These and many other questions are now being 
clarified in the actual programme negotiations 
which commenced in Brussels on 20 July 2015 
with experts from the European Commission, 
the ECB, the IMF and ESM, the euro bailout fund. 
They intend to complete the negotiations, which 
are also taking place in Athens, by the middle 
of August, and to draw up a “memorandum of 
understanding.” This will stipulate the require-
ments that will have to be met in order to obtain 
further financial assistance.
Step Three – Ratification Must Precede Disburse-
ment. The finance ministers of the euro area 
states will review the results after the negotia-
tions have been completed. Some governments, 
including those of Germany, Estonia and Finland, 
are compelled by law to allow their parliaments 
to discuss and vote on any new ESM programme. 
Only then can the third bailout package come into 
force. This will probably happen at the end of 
August. But in the meantime the Greek govern-
ment is going to have to pay salaries and service 
its debt. For this reason, if the need arises, 
another €5 billion can be added to the bridging 
loan, which amounts to roughly €7 billion. On 
20 August 2015 a credit tranche of €3.2 billion is 
due for repayment to the ECB. This debt cannot 
be serviced without the help of the bailout pack-
age or another bridging loan.
Anger and Outrage
The negotiating marathon between Greece and 
the euro states has become a symbol of how dif-
ficult it is to implement bailout policies within 
the monetary union, and confronts the euro area 
with the most serious challenge that it has ever 
faced. There is fundamental disagreement on 
the shape of an economic and politically feasi-
ble solution for Greece’s problems. The criticism 
voiced in the wake of the Key Issues Paper was 
primarily levelled at Germany. It is more or less 
Vienna and Helsinki then had an opportunity 
to discuss the results and to give their govern-
ments a negotiating mandate, which they were 
able to pass on to the chief negotiators of the 
creditor institutions – the European Commis-
sion, the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – on Fri-
day evening. At the same time the 28 EU finance 
ministers discussed the subject of a bridging 
loan for Greece. €7.16 billion were made avail-
able for a period of three months in order to 
bridge the short-term financing gap before the 
conclusion of a new programme that keeps the 
government and the economy up and running. 
On 22 July 2015 prime minister Alexis Tsipras 
succeeded in persuading parliament in Athens 
to give its assent to a second list of reforms that 
contained a number of “prior actions.” These 
included the reform of the civil justice proce-
dures and the implementation of the EU Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive that entered 
into force in 2014.
Step Two – Four weeks of Negotiations on a Third 
Bailout Package. The seven-page Euro Summit 
statement issued on 13 July 2015 lists quite pre-
cisely what the donor countries want the Greek 
government to do in the short and medium term 
in order to be able to provide Athens with further 
assistance amounting to as much as €86 billion 
over the next three years. Between €10 and €25 
billion of this is needed by the banking sector:
•	 Reform of the pension system
•	 Adoption of ambitious product market reforms 
together with a clear implementation timeline 
(they include Sunday trade, sales periods, own-
ership of pharmacies and bakeries, and opening 
of closed professions, e.g. ferry transportation)
•	 Privatization of the electricity transmission 
network operator (ADMIE), unless, that is, it 
proves possible to find competition-enhancing 
replacement measures in the energy sector
•	 Review and modernization of the procedures 
designed to facilitate collective bargaining and 
industrial action, and to deal with collective 
dismissals
•	 Measures designed to strengthen the financial 
services sector, and especially the exclusion of 
political pressure in general and with regard to 
appointments in particular
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Sources: ESM, IMF, Eurogroup © Bertelsmann Sung
“Loan merry-go-round”: 
First bridging loan is disbursed. Greece 
uses it to pay back an ECB loan tranche 
and sele its payment arrears with the IMF 
(€2.05 billion).
13.7.
15.7.
16.7.
17.7.
20.7.
22.7.
27.7.
20.8.
End of August
End of 2015
Greece
Naonal
Parliaments
EU/EMU
Euro Summit: 
Heads of state and government
of the euro area states agree on
key issues for a new bailout package.
Greek parliament approves key issues paper 
and endorses the first list of reforms. 
Proposals for legislaon on 4 issues: VAT, 
pension reform, stascs authority 
and debt brake.
Eurogroup: Finance ministers decide 
by telephone to go ahead with ESM 
negoaons on a third bailout package.
EZB raises emergency liquidity 
assistance (ELA) by €900 million. 
Another ECB loan tranche is due for repayment
(€3.2 billion).
Euro area countries and the Greek parliament 
will have to approve the ESM programme.
Scheduled conclusion of ESM negoaons: 
Finalizaon of a “Memorandum of Understanding” 
lisng the condions that Greece must meet in 
order to obtain assistance.
Second package of measures as 
spulated in the Key Issues Paper: 
Parliament approves the reform of the civil 
jusce procedures and implements the 
EU Bank Recovery and Resoluon Direcve. 
Timeline of Third Greek Bailout Package
The euro finance ministers empower 
the creditor instuons (Commission, 
ECB, IMF) to negoate with Greece 
on a new bailout package.
EU finance ministers approve 
bridging loan of €7.16 billion
(loan period of 3 months). 
Negoaons with creditors 
begin in Athens. 
The third bailout package will 
probably enter into force.
Disbursement of first loan tranche.
Probably first review of 
the reform process: 
Possible decision on 
debt restructuring.
Several naonal parliaments 
give green light 
for the negoaons.
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member state from the monetary union. Third, 
every government in the euro area has to justify 
its actions to its electorate, and not everyone is 
particularly impressed by the crisis management 
and what it has achieved.
Moreover, it has become apparent that the Greek 
problem is not only a macroeconomic one. It is 
also a problem of government. Many areas and 
institutions in Greece do not measure up to the 
standards of modern governance. There is a lack 
of the kind of structures that are needed by a 
functioning economy. However, this problem 
cannot really be resolved by leaving the euro area, 
by a debt cut, or with the help of speedy invest-
ments. There is no quick solution. The only rem-
edy is long-term reform.
The legal and political dimension has had a deci-
sive influence on bailout policy. This explains why 
only one of the immediate measures specified 
based on two arguments. One of them revolves 
around the question of whether or not the path 
that is now being pursued makes economic 
sense. The other maintains that the stringent 
conditions attached to the latest financial assis-
tance curtail the room for manoeuvre of the 
democratically elected government, and that 
in the final analysis this means that the agree-
ments are not democratic. Analysts agree that 
the size of Greek government debt is economi-
cally unsustainable. There is too much debt, 
and the Greek government will never be able to 
repay it. The IMF says this in its reports, and so 
does Mario Draghi, the president of the ECB.
Some commentators think this means that the 
Greeks should leave the euro area, at least for a 
few years. It is only way in which they will be 
able obtain a debt cut and a new currency that is 
much weaker than the euro. They argue that this 
will make it possible for them to recover their 
competitiveness and to get back on their feet in 
economic terms.
Other commentators think this means that 
the Greeks should keep the euro, and that what 
they need is a debt relief, more government invest- 
ment and fewer spending cuts. These measures 
will kick-start the Greek economy and enable it 
to grow. Those who are in agreement with the 
second approach argue that this alone will enable 
them to overcome the crisis. In other words, the 
adherents of both approaches think there is a 
need for a debt cut and for something which will 
promote growth, either in the shape of a new 
“weak” currency or government investment.
At least that is what the situation looks like in 
theory.
Unsustainable Debt Meets  
No-Bailout Clause 
But the monetary union is now confronted with a 
legal and political dilemma. First, it has adopted 
a no-bailout clause (Article 125 TFEU). Even if 
there is no complete agreement among European 
law experts as to whether or not a debt cut has to 
be interpreted as an instance of liability, there 
is good reason to believe that it provides enough 
reason to take legal action. Second, the treaties 
do not make provision for the withdrawal of a 
Sources: ESM, German Federal Ministry of Finance, 
European Commission, European Parliament
Overview of Greek 
Bailout Packages
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
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on 13 July 2015 is designed to increase revenues 
in the short term (VAT). Two set their sights on 
long-term expenditure (pension reform, the debt 
brake), whereas three are supposed to introduce 
structural change (independence of the statistics 
authority, simplification of the civil justice pro-
cedures, bank recovery and resolution).
Thus those responsible for bailout policy are cer- 
tainly attacking the root of the problem. However, 
they are also laying themselves open to the charge 
 of interfering to an unwarranted extent in the 
internal affairs of a member state. Furthermore, 
the critics argue that the stringent conditional-
ity of the financial assistance would restrict to 
restrict unduly the room for manoeuvre of a demo- 
cratically elected government, and for this reason 
the agreements were basically undemocratic.
Massive Interfering in National 
Policymaking - But Undemocratic?
Democracy is always both: It describes a system 
and despicts an ideal to which one can refer when 
one is making certain demands. In recent years 
the concept has been used primarily by populist 
parties to criticize their national democratic sys-
tems and the European Union. Strange alliances 
which are supposedly motivated by democ-
racy and a nation’s right to self-determination 
have emerged. For example, Marine Le Pen and 
Nigel Farage have both praised Alexis Tsipras 
for his decision to hold a referendum. Similarly, 
#thisisacoup, which called for democracy, was 
a Twitter storm on a global scale. Thus the word 
democracy can be used as a slogan in agitation 
and political campaigns. But what in fact do the 
decisions of the summit actually mean? And are 
they undemocratic?
It cannot be denied that the agreement signifi-
cantly curtails Greece’s political self-determi-
nation and thus its sovereignty. However, the 
reasons for this are less conclusive. Is Greece’s 
paralysis the result of the summit resolutions or 
of its debts? And when it comes to sovereignty, 
how much is still in the hands of the individual 
member states of the European Union?
Over-indebtedness always leads to a loss of sov-
ereignty. This is true of private individuals, of 
businesses and of course of nations.
Whenever private individuals or businesses 
become insolvent, they experience a massive 
loss of sovereignty, or, to put it another way, 
they lose control over their property. An official 
receiver takes over to sort out the facts, to nego-
tiate with creditors, to wind up the business and 
to repay outstanding debts. If at all possible, the 
remaining debt is repaid over an agreed period of 
time. The rest is waived. States cannot be com-
pared to private individuals or businesses, and 
have different resources at their disposal. It is 
in the nature of things that over-indebtedness 
sooner or later visibly curtails a government’s 
freedom of manoeuvre. In fact it leads to a loss 
of sovereignty even if a state still has its own 
monetary policy and the ability to devalue its 
currency. However, when this happens the loss 
of sovereignty harms the electorate more than it 
does the government. And in particular it harms 
people who have sufficient financial means in 
order to accumulate financial reserves, though 
not enough to invest them abroad.
The question of the sovereignty of the creditors 
is actually far more difficult to answer. The sov-
ereignty of donors (no matter whether they are 
private individuals or governments) includes the 
ability to dictate the terms under which they are 
prepared to lend money. Furthermore, losses are 
part of the equation. So in the event of a default 
one can in theory shrug it off as one of the risks 
of doing business.
However, the links between the member states 
of the European Union in general and of the 
monetary union in particular go far beyond a 
business relationship, since a number of sover-
eign nations decided to introduce a common cur-
rency and thus to communitarize aspects of their 
sovereignty.  The member states did this because 
they were convinced that, as Angela Merkel put 
it, “the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.” 
Her new catchphrase, which currently crops up 
in every statement on the subject, sums up the 
original motivation of the member states in a 
nutshell, though it may perhaps be misunder-
stood. In point of fact it leads us to assume that 
we could actually “do things differently.” That is 
of course true, at least in theory. But the alter-
native option available to every member state 
would be very expensive and rather risky. The 
fact of the matter is that when things are going 
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The history of bailout packages 1 and 2 demon-
strates that the power of the creditor nations 
is never greater than at the point at which a 
decision is about to be taken on whether or not 
to grant a loan. It is already on the wane when 
the negotiations on the details of conditional-
ity get under way, and sinks rapidly during the 
implementation process. At the end of the day, 
it is impossible to compel anyone to imple-
ment certain measures from the outside. The 
Greek government take ownership for them. It 
has to defend them in parliament and needs to 
persuade citizens to accept them. Its European 
partners can do nothing if the government has 
neither the will nor the strength to proceed 
with implementation. They can then decide to 
grin and bear it or to allow Greece to slide into 
insolvency at the next possible opportunity. The 
attendant risks and consequences would include 
government bankruptcy, the collapse of the 
banks, a sharp drop in economic growth and 
in the labour market, impoverishment, social 
hardships, political instability, and disintegra-
tion in Europe.
Not only the euro area countries are confron-
ted with this dilemma. When countries join 
the European Union they transfer part of 
their sovereignty to a higher political level on 
which they operate together. But since – out 
of respect for the residual sovereignty of the 
nation states – they  have very few resources 
with which to bring other EU states to heel 
whenever there are serious infringements of 
the rules, they always appear to be weak when 
one of the member states flaunts agreements 
in an aggressive manner or pays scant regard 
to common values. For example, the Hungarian 
government has on more than one occasion put 
its partners in a difficult situation.
It is easy to criticize the euro bailout policy and 
to say that it is too timid in economic terms and 
overambitious in political terms. However, the 
charge that it is not democratic cannot be sub-
stantiated. The EU is not only an economic and 
monetary union. It is also based on shared legal 
principles and shared values. Its members should 
be aware that fundamental agreements are not 
going to be called into question every time there 
is an election. That is not a coup d’état. It is a basic 
precondition for any kind of European action. 
well all of the member states benefit (more or 
less), and if things are going badly we all share in 
the liability (more or less).
 
Whether one likes it or not, the EU – and the 
monetary union – is not a group of competing 
states in which factors such as the size of the 
territory, economic power, natural resources and 
military might determine who can gain the upper 
hand. Even if in recent years there has been a vis-
ible shift of power from the European Commis-
sion to the European Council, or in other words 
to the member states, in the euro area decisions 
are taken together. Each state has one vote, and 
whether its capital is called Berlin or Bratislava 
is of no importance. However, this also means 
that the democracy of one euro area nation is 
not superior to the democracy of another nation. 
In other words, Greek democracy is not superior 
to Finnish, Latvian or French democracy. Those 
who say that their democracy is superior to that 
of the other countries, and even if it is no more 
than a rhetorical ploy, are undermining the very 
foundations of the EU and trying to smuggle 
through the back door the kind of political cul-
ture which European integration was supposed 
to overcome.
The EU as a Community of Law
Be that as it may, the principle of cooperating 
states is based on yet another premise, and 
that is the willingness to honour agreements 
voluntarily. The European Union is at its core 
a community of law. It is in the nature of legal 
relations that agreements are concluded in 
the firm belief that the partners are will-
ing to adhere to their provisions. Pacta sunt 
servanda, that is, agreements must be hon-
oured, is a fundamental legal principle. Fur-
thermore, in international law agreements 
between two states continue to remain in force 
if the government or governments of one or 
both countries changes. In recent months the 
belief that the Greek government shares these 
fundamental assumptions has been shaken 
to the core. Thus one could of course inter-
pret the final document of the Euro Summit on 
12-13 July 2015 as a reflection of the exagger-
ated aspirations of a number of euro countries. 
But one could also say that its at times ungracious 
tone is an expression of despair and weakness.
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Risks Remain
There can be no doubt about the fact that very 
significant economic and political risks are 
associated with the bailout strategy that has 
now been adopted. Thus a debt cut is still a dis-
tinct possibility. The Greek debt pile has already 
reached €320 billion, and that does not take into 
account the new bailout package. The Greek 
debt quota has reached 175 percent and is still 
going up. Hitherto the creditors have officially 
worked on the assumption that this year Greek 
government debt is going to peak at almost 
180 percent, and will go down to 120 percent by 
2021. However, the latest IMF analyses come to 
the conclusion that debt will rise to 200 percent 
over the next two years.
The IMF is now adamant that there will have to 
be a debt cut. And in Brussels there is growing 
recognition of the fact that if this fails to mate-
rialize, Greece will not be able to repay its debts. 
Even Angela Merkel recently demonstrated a will-
ingness to think about restructured loans, about 
extended maturities rates and reduced interest 
rates. However, all this was made conditional on 
whether or not the first review of the third bailout 
package at the end of 2015 turns out to be posi-
tive. The debate surrounding a voluntary “Grexit” 
and debt restructuring – and of the role of the IMF 
in the third bailout package – will thus remain on 
the agenda in the coming months.
The second big question mark hovers over the 
actual implementation of the reforms. No gov-
ernment would be happy to be told that it had 
to go ahead with such a programme, and many 
would collapse under the strain. It is still unclear 
whether the Tsipras government will be able to 
resolve the internal party disagreements about 
the course now being pursued in order to obtain 
parliamentary approval for the much-needed 
reforms and to implement them.  
Further political risks are lurking in the shadows 
in the other euro area states. There is mounting 
frustration with Greece. More and more citizens 
believe that the bailout policy is a mistake. Pop-
ulist parties are attracting new supporters. In the 
coming months there are a number of important 
elections (in Poland, Spain, Portugal, and pre-
sumably in Greece). The outcome will give us a 
foretaste of the prevalent mood in the EU in the 
years ahead, and of how the architecture of the 
euro area and its crisis policy may develop.
Sources: Eurostat, Greek Central Bank, 
Wall Street Journal, The Independent © Bertelsmann Sung
The Greek Crisis 
in Numbers
 
2008
2015
The Greek economy has contracted 
by 25%  since the middle of 2008.
50% of Greeks between the ages 
of 15 and 25 are unemployed.
In 2013 23% of the Greek populaon 
was on the brink of poverty.
Esmates say that € 70 billion  billion 
have been withdrawn from Greek banks 
over the last five years.
The Greek debt pile has risen to € 320 billion.  
175%
<BIP>
The Greek debt-to-GDP 
rao has reached 
an astronomic  175%. 
In Greece 1 out of 3 loans is non-performing.
This means that it has not been serviced for more than 90 days.
In Greece 1 out of 4 SMEs 
went out of business since 2008. 
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